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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the Netherlands, the representativeness of social partner organisations is high on the agenda, 
both in politics and in industrial relations. The debate is especially relevant in the market sector 
where trade union membership is in decline, the representation of business organisations is 
changing, and employers and employees add individual elements to the collective regulation of 
labour (see for an overview Van der Meer et al, forthcoming). In the public sector, with its legal 
responsibility for preparing and executing public policy, such developments are less clear; the 
government directly influences the terms and conditions of the employment relationship, trade 
union membership is on average at a higher level than in the market sector and the differentation of 
regulation is of more recent date (Bach et al, London 1999). 
This report aims to assess the institutional framework of industrial relations and the state of 
representativeness of social partner organisations in the public sector in the Netherlands. The paper 
is based on written and oral sources. It is part of a series of AIAS-reports for the European 
Commission on the representativeness of the national affiliates of European social interest 
organisations in economic sectors of the European Union In the fourteen other EU-member states, 
similar efforts have been initiated by research institutes. Most of these reports can be downloaded 
from the website of the Institut des Sciences du Travail of the Catholic University in Louvain-la-
Neuve in Belgium. The paper is also part of a PhD-project in progress, conducted by the principle 
author of this paper, to unveil ‘the meaning of representativeness in collective bargaining.’ 
‘Meaning’ in this context is to be understood as the perspective of representativeness de jure and 
representativeness de facto. The project will be carried out in the Netherlands, comparing the 
private and the public sector in this respect. The issue will be viewed on EU-level as well.  
The key question of this research report is: how is the representativeness of social partner 
organisations in the Dutch public sector defined? An answer may rise out of related questions, 
such as: how has the issue developed with the introduction of the so-called ‘sectormodel’ that 
was introduced in 1993? What has been legally established about representativeness? Does 
the position of the trade union confederations correspond with their member density? And to 
what extent is the actual situation founded on, or reflected in the legal basis for 
representativeness?  
Hereto, the second section of this paper outlines the system of collective bargaining in the 
Dutch public sector. Next, in section three, the focus of attention will shift to the players 
participating in the process of collective bargaining and the rules of ‘the game’. The issue of 
representativeness is highlighted in section four. Finally in section five some conclusions will 
be drawn.    
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2 FRAMEWORK, EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 
The public sector in the Netherlands encloses the activities, organisations, institutions and 
services for which the State or its representatives can be identified as employer and which 
structure, goals and operations are being established by public authorities and supported by 
public finance, correspond with the sectors of the public sector. Wage setting in the public 
sector used to be a unilateral responsibility of the government until 1993. In that year the 
public sector was subdivided into 8 sectors, in which altogether more than 784.000 people are 
employed. The subdivision is based on multiple criteria: first on basis of a criterion that 
corresponds with the territorial devolution in the Dutch State system with regard to the sectors 
State, Provinces, Local Authorities and District Waterboards. Secondly, eight parts of the 
public sector are established according to a functional criterion: Education, Defence, Police 
and the Judiciary. Out of the sector Education emerged the sector Academic Hospitals in 1996 
and subsequently the sectors University Education, Higher Vocational Education and 
Research Institutes, adding up to twelve sectors in 1999 (Annex 2, Table 4). 
In addition, there is a large number of service-providers that are financed by supplements of 
the State or from social security premiums. The organisations work for the public interest, but 
their activities are not labelled as public activities pur sang. Generally, private corporate 
bodies execute these activities. This cluster of organisations is known as ‘contributed and 
subsidised’ Semi-Public Sector (G&G sector) and includes a large scale of bodies. The 
activities range from public health to musical orchestras. The G&G sector is also marked as 
non-profit sector, because the organisations do not aim at profit (Plessen, 1996). 
Private education is not seen to be a part of the semi-public sector. Private and public 
education is equally treated and this group of private organisations differs profoundly from 
the units in the G&G-sector. This equalisation of organisations finds a basis in the 
Constitution and else on the fact that the development of the legal position of employees in 
private and public education institutes corresponds closely to the legal position of the public 
sector employees (Plessen, 1996). In the context of this report, private education will be 
acknowledged as an integral part of the sector Education. 
The majority of the organisations in the G&G Sector originates from what is called ‘private 
initiative’. Many foundations and associations, with activities in the field of health care and 
welfare were mostly ideological, privately financed entities. The Dutch State has consciously 
decided not to integrate these organisations in the network of the public service. It offered the 
employees a status of ‘semi-public employee’. The entities are legally autonomous, 
notwithstanding the fact that they are fully or partially financed by the State. This construction 
for the Dutch context probably finds an explanation in the desire in Christian-political circles 
for ‘sovereignty within the private domain’ and the Roman-catholic principle of 
‘subsidiarity’: in case society provides a service, the State does not need to offer a similar 
provision (Plessen, 1996). On balance, the employees working in the semi-public sector are 
not employed by the State, although they are paid from collective resources (van Peijpe, 1998; 
Plessen, 1996). 
The legal autonomy of the organisations in the semi-public sector leaves the State no space to 
play a role as employer. The independent status also limits the State influence on 
organisation, goals and the mode of operation of the semi-public sector. This scope of this 
report is therefore limited to the context of the collective labour negotiations in the twelve 
sectors of the ‘branch’ Public Sector.   
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Since the late 1980s, the industrial relations in the Dutch private sector have served as a 
benchmark, as a point of reference for the development of the framework of industrial 
relations in the public sector. This process of ‘normalising’, i.e. inducing elements of the 
industrial relations of the private sector in the framework of the public sector, is founded 
principally on the motive to improve the labour market and to modernise the labour relations 
in the public sector.  
The difference between the legal position of public sector employees and private sector 
workers is threefold. The first difference concerns the appointment of employees and their 
legal protection, also known as ‘the individual public sector employee status’. The second 
difference refers to the settlement of the terms and conditions of employment under public 
law. And finally, the framework of collective bargaining is different from the private sector. 
The difference concerns the rules for reaching collective labour agreements, as the freedom of 
contract applied in the private sector rules out imperative negotiations between the social 
partners. These three elements, together referred to as ‘the public sector employee status’ (in 
short: the status) are used to indicate the different legal position of the public sector and 
private sector employees. The essence does not relate to the specific terms and conditions of 
employment, but to structures and legal frameworks (Moll 2001; Van Peijpe; 1998; Wilke, 
1996).  
The fact that public sector employers are also public service providers, makes them differ 
from employers in the private sector. This specific characteristic reflects in the relation with 
their employees as well. International treaties, European guidelines, the constitution and 
national acts have (evidently) to be taken in account by the public employers. These 
imperatives also have a bearing on the employer’s relation with their employees. Furthermore, 
the employers are accountable to parliament for their policy. On balance, the public sector 
employer is confronted with a number of dilemmas unknown to the employers in the private 
sector. This fact poses a natural limit on the process of ‘normalising’ labour relations in the 
public sector. No matter how the relation between public employer and public employee will 
develop: the position of employers in the public and in the private sector will never 
correspond fully.  
The ‘status-discussion’ is underway for almost half a century (Kranenburg, 1958; De Jong, 
Niessen, 1982). In 1997, the government considered a general abolition of the ‘status’ by no 
means a solution for the problems on the labour market. The ‘status’ was no longer 
considered to hamper the functioning of the labour market. However, the government did not 
rule out that social partners in individual sectors would decide to abandon the status partially 
(Moll, 2001).  
The Dutch parliament requested the government to investigate the conditions under which the 
abolition of the status could take place. Eventually the Council for Public Sector Labour 
Relations (ROP) issued a report about this matter. Public sector’ employers associations and 
trade unions were united in their opinion that the moment for abolition of the status was too 
early. Additionally, the social partners expressed their preference for a gradual process of 
normalising industrial relations in the public sector (ROP, 1998). A probably more fruitful 
discussion about the status leads along the path of individual judgement of each part of the 
legal position on its merit (Niessen, 1982; van Peijpe, 1998; ROP, 1999). Taking in account 
the consequences of normalising for the unilateral labour relation, resignation, judicial 
protection, limitation of constitutional rights, social security and participation individually for 
public sector employees will do probably more justice to the specific position of the public 
employee in separate sectors.   
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There are noticeable differences between the position of public sector employee and the 
worker in the private sector. The most important differences de jure and de facto in this 
respect are listed below.  
•  Appointment. The formal side refers to the appointment: a unilateral legal act that results 
in the employment of the public employee. This differs from the appointment of an 
employee in the private sector: a private legal act, which is based on a bilateral labour 
agreement. The legal difference, however, has no practical meaning. It is undisputed that 
the appointment only comes into effect if the public employee involved agrees on the 
terms of the appointment (van Peijpe, 1998). 
•  Resignation. In case of resignation, the employer in the public sector has to make a choice 
from a limitative number of prescribed legal grounds. This is unlike the situation in the 
private sector. This seems a significant limitation of the freedom of the employer in the 
public sector. However, one can hardly think of situations in which it is not possible to 
justify the resignation of a public employee on one of the legal grounds. The ground for 
resignation can hardly be a problem, as long as the public service employer is prepared to 
unveil the genuine motives for this act (van Peijpe, 1998). 
•  Legal protection. The unilateral legal appointment in the public service implies that the 
interpretation and application of his legal position is not covered by civil law. 
Subsequently, a conflict about the rights and obligations will not be taken to a civil court. 
The individual protection of public employees is put in hands of the administrative court. 
The administrative judge has been granted powers for a more active role, which might 
serve as an advantage. However, a public sector employee is only able to file a complain 
in case of a decision (or refusal of a decision) of his employer. Another difference is the 
rather complex matter of powers in administrative law. This does not occur in civil labour 
law. 
•  Constitutional rights. Since 1988 the Public Servants Act includes a provision concerning 
this matter. What the freedom of expression, association and demonstration concerns: the 
proper fulfilment of the function and the functioning of the public services are taken into 
account. According to the Public Employees Act (art. 125a AW), the public employee 
should refrain from exercising this constitutional right, if satisfactory performance as an 
employee is not guaranteed.   
The freedom of expression can be at stake when a public employer assumes too easily a 
lack of reliability of certain public employees in case of a vacant position, or in case of 
resignation (art. 125c AW). The possibilities for selection and resignation are limited in 
case of unreliability for the employment of classified functions. Classified functions are 
positions that enable the public employee to damage the interests of the state (van Peijpe, 
1998). 
•  Social security. Both the General Old Age Pensions Act (AOW) and General Relatives 
Act (ANW) don not distuingish between public sector or private sector employee. This is 
also the case for the National Assistance Act (ABW). The employee insurance 
Disablement Benefits Act (WAO) is also in force for the public sector since 1998. The 
Unemployment Benefits Act (WW) and the Sickness Benefits Act (ZW) have been 
applied on public service employees more recently, in 2001. However, differences with 
the public sector remain, as social partners agree in collective labour agreements on 
supplements on the legal allowances. In the private sector this is already the case for a 
longer period of time, so one would assume a similar position for public employees in this 
matter.   
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•  Direct participation. The first Works Council Act (WOR) originates from 1950, and has 
been applied in the private sector since. The actual WOR differs considerably from its 
blueprint some fourty years earlier. With the introduction of the Act in 1993 in the public 
sector, the government considered very carefully not to create an arrangement for direct 
participation for the public sector, which would be more or less similar to the WOR. It 
avoided the existence of two provisions, one for the private sector and one for the public 
sector, which might in time lead to unjustifiable dissimilarities with the private sector. 
The government aimed at a private sector-modelled form of direct participation. This 
implies that direct participation in the public sector has to resemble direct participation in 
the private sector as much as possible, until the special position of the State as employer 
urges the legislator to make exceptions. Only where it proves to be necessary for the 
incorporation of the direct participation in the public sector, the WOR has been amended 
(Sprengers, 1998). 
On balance, the difference between the private and the public sector with regard to statutory 
workers participation has decreased significantly.   
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3 PRINCIPLES AND PLAYERS 
3.1 PRINCIPLES 
Though the differences between the public sector and the private sector are less profound than 
they used to be, the procedures for determining the collective terms and conditions of 
employment deviate sharply. This concerns the issues at stake and the rules for consultation 
negotiation. 
•  Issues Rules have been made to establish the subjects of negotiations at central level and 
sectoral level between the public sector employers and the public employee trade union 
confederations. As a point of reference ‘all subjects of general importance for the legal 
position of public employees’, are subjected to negotiations between the social partners 
(Van Peijpe, 1998).  
•  Consultation and negotiation Only until recently, it was common to speak of ‘collective 
consultation’, rather than ‘collective bargaining’ in the public sector. Though collective 
bargaining is more in line with recent developments, as negotiations tend to resemble 
those in the private sector, the phrase ‘consultation’ refers more genuinely to the legal 
framework for the regulations of the terms and conditions of employment. Both phrases 
will be used alternately in a same meaning. 
The most important elements of this legal framework are: (a) the power of the State to 
determine unilaterally the terms and conditions of employment, (b) the obligation to consult 
extensively with the representative organisations of the public employees, (c) the collective 
and individual consequences of agreements, (d) the extension of collective agreements and (e) 
the settlement of disputes (Van Peijpe, 1998). 
•  (a) Unilateral determination. The power of the State to fix the terms and conditions of 
employment for the public employees has been restricted with the introduction of the 
‘requirement of agreement’ in 1988. In 1993 it was laid down in the General Public 
Employee Regulation (ARAR)
1 Formally, unilateral determination is still the case. The 
state not only has the power to issue rules; the State is even obliged to do so on basis of 
the Public Employees Act. This Act also indicates which subjects are to be laid down in 
rules. 
•  (b) Requirement of agreement. The ‘requirement of agreement’ is the core-feature of the 
framework and refers to the amendments in the individual legal position of public sector 
employees. The requirement is a compulsory issue for all the sectors in the public service 
and is laid down in a sector agreement, protocol or act. Social partners meet in the sector 
committee. In this sector body the sectoremployer and the representatives of the public 
sector employees (appointed by the four public sector employee trade union 
confederations, i.e. the ACOP, CCOOP, AC and CMHF) negotiate on the terms and 
conditions of employment.   
The ‘requirement of agreement’ consists roughly of the elements ‘agreement’ and 
‘majority’. Exceptions to the rule have to be borne in mind as well. What ‘agreement’ 
concerns: a regulation, which amends the individual position of the public employees 
                                                 
1 Art. 105 ARAR   
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involved, can only be determined if the Minister has reached agreement with the Sector 
Committee. In this context ‘majority’ refers to the majority of the public employee trade 
union confederations in agreement with the Minister. In theory, the minister might come 
to an agreement with the two smallest public employee trade union confederations. If the 
votes are equally divided, the Minister decides.   
Acts that apply to all persons or relate to all employees, that are not covered by the 
requirement of agreement, are excluded from this principle. Equally excluded are the 
regulations for public employees with a similar content as new laws for the employees in 
the private sector. Existing labour legislation can be applied on public employees if, on 
balance, their legal position is not affected. Evidently, the requirement of agreement does 
not cover legal amendments that result form international treaties. 
•  (c) Collective and individual consequences of agreement. Out of the public employee law 
rises a rather static image of their regulation of the terms and conditions of employment. 
It remains unchanged as long as no amendments have been induced. Contrary, the 
collective labour agreement is always a temporary provision, which usually has duration 
between one and two years. After the collective labour agreement has expired, the 
employers involved are free to determine the terms and conditions of employment they 
desire: existing labour contracts can be amended with the consent of the individual 
employee. Social partners in the public sector negotiation bodies have the ability to erase 
this difference, if they agree to limit the duration of the negotiation results.    
A word about the individual consequences of an agreement: a binding regulation for all 
public employees involved, may come into effect if agreement has been reached with a 
majority of the public employee trade union confederations. A collective labour 
agreement only binds those employees, which are a member of a union that has signed the 
agreement (that is: before the extension of collective agreements). Agreement with the 
Sector committee implies that the negotiated result (a regulation) can be established. In 
case of a lack of agreement, the regulation at stake will not come into effect. There is no 
road in between. In particular, there is no provision for the sectoremployer to reach an 
agreement with only one of the public employee trade union confederations, in case an 
agreement with the other confederations does not seem in reach. This marks a contrast 
with the private sector, were it is possible to conclude an agreement with a single union. 
The unions (and their members) not party to the agreement, are not bound. 
•  (d) Extension of collective agreements. it might occur that a public body or entity does not 
comply to the sectoral agreement on the terms and conditions of employment and 
consequently does not incorporate them into the legal body at local level. To avoid this, 
use is being made of a provision in the Public Employee Act (art. 126 AW), that provides 
for supervision of the State on the regulations of collective labour body of the Local 
Authorities. The application aims to have a similar effect as the extension of collective 
agreements in the private sector, but does not constitute a general measure for the entire 
sector. In fact, it is an incidental correction of an individual employer that does not 
comply with the negotiated result on sectoral level. This instrument is qualified as the 
quasi-extension of collective agreements (van Peijpe, 1998). 
•  (e) Settlement of disputes. Unlike the private sector, an official Advisory and Arbitration 
Committee (AAC) has been established for the public sector in 1984, which consists of 10 
expert members who mediate on request (its decisions are not binding, but command 
considerable authority). Since 1986, the Local Advisory and Arbitration Committee 
(LAAC) operates in a similar way for the local authorities. The provinces and the district 
waterboards have joined in the LAAC-provision, which was laid down in rules by the 
Union of Local Authorities.     
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The regulation for the settlement of disputes attributes two powers to the AAC: a power 
to issue an advice, which is not legally binding for the parties, and a power to arbitrate, 
leading to a binding decision. The AAC has been scarcely involved in cases of arbitration. 
The Committee is competent in disputes that rise out of matters, which are subject to 
consultation between the social partners. The appearance of the AAC is generally seen as 
successful. To a large extent the advises of the Committee have been observed. A 
courtruling made clear that labour action by air traffic controllers was unlawful ‘because 
prior to the collective action, not all possibilities had been exhausted’. According to some, 
this ruling not only made collective action for public employees more complex, but 
incorporated the AAC-procedure into the right to strike as well (Akkermans, 1984; van 
Peijpe, 1998). 
•  (f) Right to strike: collective action. Closely  related to the issue of consulation and 
negotiation is the right to collective action in the public sector. The 1970s saw a starting 
point for the development of the collective right to strike in the Netherlands. A court 
acknowledged the principle of the right to strike. Later, in 1986 the Supreme Court (HR) 
established the collective right to strike. The Supreme Court based its ruling on a 
provision in the European Social Charter (art. 6, sub 4) where the collective right to strike 
for employers and employees was acknowledged. The Netherlands, which ratified the 
treaty in 1980, made a temporary reservation, which excluded the public employees from 
the effect of this provision. The legislator would issue a statutory solution for this issue. 
The reservation, then, could be repealed, and the public employees would be able to 
appeal directly to this fundamental right (Van Peijpe, 1998).   
In 1991, the government decided that public employees and the employees in the private 
sector would be granted an equal collective right to strike. Exceptions would be made for 
military personnel and part of the civil personnel employed by the Ministry of Defence. If 
the reservation of the European Social Charter (art. 6, sub 4) will be repealed, the 
collective right to strike for public employees will be acknowledged by the legislator (van 
Peijpe, 1998). So far (December 2002) this has not been the case. The collective right to 
strike is, on balance, acknowledged in jurisprudence and a statutory provision does not 
seem likely. 
•  (g) Admittance. A vital element in the process of collective bargaining is the 
representation of the public sector employees at the negotiating table. All employees in 
the public sector have the option to adhere through membership to one of the public 
employee trade union confederations. No barriers exist in this respect. 
3.2 PLAYERS 
The actual framework of collective bargaining in the public sector is legally founded on the 
Sector Protocol of 1993. Parties to the Protocol were the Minister for the Interior, the 
Interprovincial Consultative body (IPO), the Union of Local Authorities (VNG) and the 
Union of District Waterboards (UvW) on the side of the employers, and the four public 
employee trade union confederations i.e. the General Confederation of Public Sector 
Personnel (ACOP), the Christian Confederation of Educational and Public Sector Personnel 
(CCOOP), the Centre of Public Sector Employees (AC) and the Confederation of Managerial 
and Professional Personnel employed in the Public Sector, Education, Companies and 
Institutions (CMHF). 
The ACOP is the public branch of the Dutch Trade Union Federation (FNV), while the 
CCOOP is the public division of the Christian Trade Union Federation (CNV). The CMHF, as   
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a confederation, is incorporated in the Federation of Managerial and Professional Staff Unions 
(MHP). The AC, however, is not part of an overarching federative trade union structure.  
The parties to the Sector Protocol have co-founded the Council for Public Sector Labour 
Relations (ROP). The ROP has a task in coordinating the policy for the terms and conditions 
of employment and in advising the sectors and the central government. The ROP-Council in 
its task and composition resembles the bi-partite Labour Foundation (STAR) in the private 
sector. The position of the ROP was consolidated in the ROP-agreement, which was signed 
by the above-mentioned parties in 1997. The public employers and the public employee trade 
union confederations made agreements by protocol about the issues that are subject to 
negotiations on central and sectoral level. In the ROP, at central level, social partners 
nowadays negotiate about pension. Subjects like for instance statutory social security and 
labour market policy are decided on at decentral level in each of the eight sectors (currently 
twelve sectors) (Van Peijpe, 1998). 
In anticipation on the implementation of the sector model, the public sector employers 
organised themselves in 1992 in an association, the League of Public Sector Employers 
(VSO), where they coordinate their positions for the settlement of terms and conditions of 
employment. As a result of the process of decentralisation in 1999 in the sector Education, the 
number of organised employers has risen to twelve.  
The public employee trade union confederations united in the Cooperating Public Employee 
trade Union Confederations (SCO), with a similar aim (for an overview, see Annex 2, table 
1). 
In 1994, the Minister for the Interior and the social partners founded the Centre for Public 
Sector Labour Relations (CAOP). The CAOP offers a range of services to its founders. The 
services rendered, include offering 'neutral' ground for negotiations, independent reporting of 
meetings, advice and arbitration in labour conflicts in the public sector and scientific research 
on public sector labour relation issues (CAOP Foundation Act). Offering this rare mix of 
services, makes CAOP a relatively unique organisation in the Netherlands, and perhaps even 
in Europe. 
At decentral level, collective bargaining takes place in twelve sectors. The sectors not only 
differ in size, but in degree of unity as well. This fact has evidently consequences for the co-
ordination of the labour policy in the Public Sector. In the Sectors State, Defence and the 
Judiciary a single minister is responsible for settling the terms and conditions of employment. 
In the sectors Education, University Education, Higher Education, Research Institutes, Police, 
Provinces, Local Authorities and District Waterboards a multitude of actors perform a role as 
employer. 
The setting of the negotiations in each individual sector is listed in short below. The sector 
Local Authorities is viewed in more detail. 
•  State.  The Minister for the Interior and the four public employee trade union 
confederations negotiate in the Sector Committee State (SOR) about the terms and 
conditions of employment in this sector. The ARAR sets rules for the negotiation process 
and the issues for bargaining (van Peijpe, 1998). 
•  Provinces. On basis of the Sector Protocol for the Sectoral Consultative Body on terms 
and conditions of employment for the Provinces (SPA), the Interprovincial Employers 
League (IWV), a body of the IPO engages in negotiations with the public employee trade 
union confederations ACOP, CCOOP and CMHF. The consultation deals about subjects 
that can be labelled as sectoral issues. Additionally, parties may agree on other subjects, 
which are centrally decided on to be sectoral issues. Apart from this, parties have the   
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ability to agree on other issues on which they decide sectoral agreements should be made. 
The sectoral agreements are binding for the provinces and have to be laid down in 
regulations by the provincial authorities (Sprengers, 1998). 
•  District Waterboards. The negotiations in the sector District Waterboards are guided by 
the Protocol for the national settlement of terms and conditions of employment of the 
District Waterboards 1998 (LAWA Protocol). The Union of District Waterboards (UvW) 
and three public employee trade union confederations ACOP, CCOOP and CMHF take 
part in the bargaining process. The meet at the National Consultative Body on terms and 
conditions of employment for the District Waterboards (LAWA). Negotiations take place 
about the sectoral issues mentioned in the protocol. The sectoral agreement is binding for 
the members of the UvW, which include all district waterboards of the country. There is 
consensus to deal with as much issues of terms and conditions of employment on sectoral 
level as possible. Because of the relatively small size of the sector, the district 
waterboards aim at uniformity in their terms and conditions of employment (Sprengers, 
1998). 
•  Local Authorities. The Union of Local Authorities (VNG) aims at concluding agreements 
with the public sector employee trade union confederations on the terms of employment 
for personnel employed in the sector. Furthermore this employers’ association supports 
her members collectively and individually in their administrative tasks. The VNG is open 
to membership for municipalities and Regional Cooperations (Statuten VNG). Though 
membership is not compulsory, all municipalities have joined the VNG, acting 
exclusively on behalf of her 504 members (2001). A mounting pressure from the 
government to allocate local administrative and financial resources more efficiently, have 
led a number of municipalities to engage in intermunicipal or regional cooperation. In a 
most extensive sense, cooperation takes the form of municipal fusion. The ongoing 
process of Municipal Regrouping (Gemeentelijke Herindeling) resulted -and will result- 
in a diminishing number of municipalities. In 2001 a number of 52 municipalities were 
subject to the process of regrouping, which will eventually lead to 20 ‘new’ 
municipalities (VNG/CvA). 
Social partner organisations of the sector local authorities meet in the National Consultative 
Body for Employment and Conditions in Local Authorities (LOGA). Here the Board of 
Labour Affairs (CVA/VNG) negotiates with three public sector employee trade union 
confederations: the ACOP, the CCOOP and the CMHF). The rules for the bargaining process 
have been laid down in 1993 in the Protocol for the settlement of the terms and conditions of 
employment of the local authorities (LOGA). The consultation on the level of the local 
authorities is threefold: 
•  The first level refers to the Collective arrangement for the terms and conditions of 
employment (CAR). This arrangement comprises of the main issues for the local level 
and is binding for all local authorities. The CAR-agreement is subject of negotiation at 
sectoral level in the LOGA. Bargaining issues in the CAR involve (amongst others) both 
procedural and material issues, such as the function and salary structure, the annual wage 
increase, flexible pension, working hours, sectoral social security arrangements, leave and 
training facilities.Detailed implementation of what has been agreed on in the CAR-
agreement, takes place at local level in the Local Consultative Body (GO). Social partner 
organisations wishing to participate, other than ACOP, CCOOP and CMHF have to be 
representative. The decision to allow new parties to participate in the negotiations at GO-
level, is a local prerogative (CAR/UWO).   
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•  At the second level, the Execution Agreement (UWO) comprises of a detailed 
implementation of CAR-issues. Local authorities have an option to take part in the UWO-
agreement. If they choose to do so, the LOGA substitutes the local consultative body 
(GO) as a platform for negotiations. 
•  On local level -the third level- the negotiations take place in the local consultative body 
(GO) about terms and conditions of employment, of which parties in the LOGA have 
decided, that for reason of their local character, are not binding for all local authorities. 
An exception has been made for ‘the four big municipalities’, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht 
and The Hague. These cities are bound by the sectoral agreement only with regard to the 
subjects, which have been transferred from the central to the sectoral level. The collective 
labour agreement is in principal binding for all municipalities, which results (therefore) in full 
coverage of the agreement. However, the ‘four big municipalities’ have the power to negotiate 
independently on local level about some issues. In general all municipalities have the ability 
to negotiate on local level about the implementation of the agreement reached at sectoral 
level.  
If the municipalities opt for adherence to the execution agreement (UWO), they deny 
themselves the possibility to negotiate the implementation of sectoral agreements on local 
level in the local consultative body GO. In recent years, a growing number of municipalities 
have been opting for the execution agreement UWO. This arrangement is gaining significance 
as a service of the VNG-employers section for its members, as currently 325 municipalities 
(64%) participate in the UWO-agreement. The administrative workload of local negotiating 
for municipal authorities is most clearly the motive for this trend (VNG/CVA). 
The local consultative body (GO), as an exclusive platform for negotiations on local level, 
became subject of discussion with the introduction of the Works Council Act (WOR). The 
Act has been in force for the public sector since 1995. The Act, instituting the works council 
(also) on municipal level unmistakably challenges the position of the local consultative body 
(GO). Various models have been developed to demarcate the relation between these two fora. 
A solution probably will not be found in the substitution of the local consultative body GO by 
the works council, but more likely in a division of powers between the public sector employee 
trade union confederations and the works council (Sprengers, 1998). 
On balance, the outcome of negotiations on local level may result in minor deviations from 
the agreement on sectoral level, and in less than minor differences in the implementation of 
the sectorally negotiated results (Sprengers, 1998; VNG/CvA). Both the increasing 
significance of the UWO-agreement and the introduction of the work council on municipal 
level put mounting pressure on the position of the GO-body as an exclusive platform for 
negotiations on local level. 
EDUCATION 
The largest public sector by far, Education, consists of seven subsectors, i.e. Primary 
Education (PO), Secondary Education (VO), the sector Occupational Education and Adult 
Education (BVE), University Education (WO), Higher Vocational Education (HBO), 
Research Institutes (OI) and the Academic Hospitals (AZ). 
Consultation in these subsectors takes place between the Minister of Education, the employers 
in the subsector and the public employee trade union associations. However, the situation 
differs from subsector to subsector.    
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What concerns consultation between the Minister and the employers: in the Employers 
Administrative Consultative Body (BWO) deliberation takes place between the Minister of 
Education and the employers of the sectors Primary Education, Secondary Education and the 
sector Occupational Education and Adult Education. Consultation takes place on basis of the 
Protocol Employers Consultative Body PO, VO and BVE. 
In the Consultative Body Higher Education and Scientific Research (WBHW) the Minister of 
Education meets the employers of the sectors WO, HBO, OI en AZ. The terms for 
consultation are laid down in the Protocol for the Consultative Body Higher Education and 
Scientific Research  (Protocol WBHW). However, the deliberation in consultative bodies 
between the Minister and employers (BWO and WBHW) are merely of a coordinative 
character, and therefore cannot be seen as negotiations pur sang. 
In the Sector Committee Education (SCOW) consultation takes place between the Minister of 
Education and the public employee trade union associations about the protocol-subjects and 
non-protocol subjects for the sectors PO. Consultation also takes place about the non-protocol 
subjects for the sectors VO and BVE. ‘Protocol’ in this context refers to the Sector Protocol 
1993. Bargaining in the SCOW-committee is based on a decree.  
In the subsectors WO, HBO, OI and AZ, negotiations on the terms and conditions of employment 
take place fully on decentral level. The Minister of Education concluded agreements in 1998 and 
1999 with the associations of employers involved and the public employee trade union 
associations. The convenants enable the employers to perform more as ‘employer’ in the 
negotiations for the terms of employment. 
In these subsectors the Association of Dutch Universities (VSNU), the Council for Higher 
Vocational Education (HBO-Raad), the Employers Association of Research Institutes (WVOI) and 
the Associations of Academic Hospitals (VAZ) act in their role as employer, and the public 
employee trade union confederations ACOP, CCOOP, AC and CMHF as their counterparts. Social 
partners in the subsector Academic Hospitals meet in the National Consultative Body Academic 
Hospitals (LOAZ). The issues which are subject to negotiation in the subsectors are those which 
are not exclusively reserved for consultation in the ROP-council (Source: CAOP). 
DEFENCE 
For the sector Defence consultation for the terms and conditions of employment takes place in 
the Sectoral Consultative Body Defence (SOD) between the Minister of Defence and the 
public employee trade unions confederations ACOP, CCOOP, AC and CMHF. The issues are 
decided both for the military and civil employees working in the sector. Negotiation takes 
place on basis of a sectoral regulation, the Decree Organised Consultation Sector Defence and 
the issues of bargaining are similar to the protocol issues. On the level of the armed forces 
consultation takes place in Special Committees for the Ministery, the Army, the Navy, the 
Airforce and the Defence Interservice Commando. In the Special Committees (three 
committees for military personnel issues and five committees for civil personnel issues) both 
the Commander of the individual military force and the Secretary General of the Ministry of 
Defence negotiate with the public employee trade unions confederations. Consultation takes 
place about the execution and implementation of the issues, which were decided on at central 
level for the military and civil workforce (Source: CAOP). 
POLICE 
Consultation on the terms and conditions of employment for the sector Police takes place in 
the Committee for Consultation in Police and Public Employee Issues (CGOP). In the CGOP   
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social partners discuss issues that are of general importance for the legal position of the public 
employees (legal position, general rules for the police, personnel policy). The consultation 
procedure is not based on protocol, but on a sectoral regulation. Police corps have their 
Regional Committee for Consultation in Police and Public Employee Issues (RCGOP). 
Consultation on this level takes place between the Corps Authority and a representation of the 
public employee trade unions confederations. Issues that have been decided for on central 
level cannot be subjects of discussion on regional level (Sprengers, 1998). 
JUDICIARY 
In the sector Judiciary, the Minster of Justice and a single public employee trade union 
confederation, the CMHF, negotiated on the terms and conditions of employment for the 
judicial public employees. Negotiations take place in the Sector Committee Judiciary 
(SORM). The issues for collective bargaining are laid down in the Judicial Public Employees 
Act and correspond to the protocol.   
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4 REPRESENTATIVENESS 
4.1 REPRESENTATIVENESS DE JURE 
The position of the representatives, acting on behalf of the employees in the sector State, was 
arranged prior to the subdivision in 1993. This provision has been in force ever since. Unlike 
negotiations that take place in the private sector, rules have been issued about representativeness of 
the organisations that are allowed to take part in the collective bargaining. 
The Public Servants Act (AW) attributes to the government the power to issue rules regarding ‘the 
manner in which consultation has to take place with the appropriate unions
2. Another legal source, 
the General Public Servant Regulation establishes the position of the four public sector employee 
trade union confederations ACOP, CCOOP, AC and CMHF
3. They appoint the representatives 
(i.e. affiliated unions), which negotiate on their behalf in the sector committee. Furthermore, the 
legislator permits the government to admit ‘other confederations which on account of the number 
of public sector employees they represent, can be judged as representative, as long as their 
admittance does not interfere with the public interest’. Finally, the government has the ability to 
withdraw or to suspend the admittance in case the criteria of representativeness are no longer met, 
or in the public interest
4. 
The legislator clearly legitimises the position of the four confederations as accepted partners. Their 
representativeness has not been put to the test. Other confederations, though, will have to prove 
their representativeness before they will be admitted. Both legal sources provide no further details 
on what conditions have to be met in order to participate in collective bargaining. Reversibly, apart 
from the reference to the ‘lack of representativeness’ and the ‘public interest’, the exact 
circumstances under which suspension or withdrawal might occur are not clarified.  
On balance, the legal framework does not reach beyond the attribution of power to admit, to 
suspend or to withdraw the admittance of ‘appropriate unions’. What concerns admittance: it is 
assumed, though, that an organisation will succeed in admittance by proving to have as many 
members as the smallest confederation already accepted as partner in negotiations. Equally, the 
distribution among the different categories of public sector empoloyees is considered to be another 
criterion for the establishment of ‘representativeness’. A refusal to be admitted will quite likely be 
witnessed as an arbitrary act and therefore be considered unlawful. This will clearly not to be the 
case when it concerns a banned organisation. As stated, withdrawal or suspension might occur in 
the public interest (van Peijpe, 1998). 
The legal framework has not been applied: since 1993, no new participants have requested to be 
admitted, and no existing partners have been excluded with reference to what has been legally 
issued.  
                                                 
2   Art. 125 AW. 
3   Art. 105 ARAR. 
4   Art. 106, sub 2 AW.   
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4.2 REPRESENTATIVENESS DE FACTO 
Next, the actual situation regarding representativeness will be illustrated with data on union 
density (Annex 2).In January 2000, more than half of the members of the CCOOP-
confederation were employed in the sector Education. This is also the case for the CMHF. 
The AC, however, has a relatively low share in the sector Education, but the majority of their 
members are employed in the sector Defence. The ACOP is well represented in both the 
sectors Education and Local Authorities. Though a great deal of members of the public sector 
employee trade union confederations are employed in the sector Education, this sector does 
not have the highest degree of union membership. Approximately 44,6 % of the employees is 
member of a public sector trade union. In the sector Judiciary union membership rates 89,2%. 
Union density in the sectors Police and Defence is high: more than 75% of the population has 
adhered to a union. In contrast, the public employees in the sectors Provinces, Local 
Authorities and District Waterboards are less organised. On average, 48,9% of the public 
sector employees has a union membership (Annex 2, Table 5). 
Over the period 1990-1997 the overall union membership amongst public sector employees 
has increased gradually. This trend is witnessed in most sectors. However, the period 1997-
1999 indicates a reversed trend. In the year 2000 union membership of almost all sector has 
augmented sligthly. After a period of mounting membership (1993-1997), the sector Defence 
has shown a significant sharp decrease in union membership of approximately 10% over the 
period 1998-2000. One explanation might be the increase of Defence personnel with a labour 
contract of limited duration; a group, which might be less inclined to union membership 
(Annex 2, Table 6). 
In 1998 the NOVON, an AC-union, terminated its membership of the AC and transferred to the 
ACOP. This shift resulted in relative low figures concerning union membership in the sectors 
Provinces (5,8%), Local Authorities (2,5%) and District Waterboards (0,2%) since. As a result of 
this development, and under some pressure of the other partners, the AC no longer joins in the 
negotiations in these sectors anymore. The AC did not file for legal revision of her position; it was 
on balance a ‘voluntary withdrawal’. In updated versions of the protocols in the sectors Provinces, 
Local Authorities and District Waterboards, the AC is not involved as participant. Conversely, the 
AC has the largest share in the sector Defence (39,1%) (Annex 2, Table 7). 
The relatively modest membership rates of the CMHF (Provinces: 1,2%, Local Authorities: 1,8%, 
District Waterboards: 0,9%) might raise questions in the future about its representativeness in these 
sectors. Bearing in mind its even lower density rates than the AC in these sectors, one wonders 
about its position as a credible representative organisation. At the same time this situation shines a 
feeble light on the motives for the exclusion of the AC, as mentioned. Distribution of density and 
acceptation may be two additional motives for these facts. Figures (Annex 2, Table 8) show that 
CMHF has a relatively more even distribution of members over the sectors than the AC.  
Until recently, the NvvR, a CMHF-affiliated union, claimed an exclusive position in the 
sector Judiciary, being the sole partner for consultation on the terms and condition of 
employment. As stated, this position was legally enforced. Apart from the magistrates and 
related legal staff, which are predominantly CMHF-members, administrative personnel and 
facility services employees are also employed in this sector. This group of public sector 
employees, to a great extent affiliated with ABVAKABO (a public sector ACOP-union), is 
administratively considered to be part of the sector State. The CMHF-share in union 
membership (100%) has to be put into this perspective. However, the presence of ACOP-
affiliated members (probably a multitude of CMHF-members
5) put mounting pressure on both 
                                                 
5   According to ACOP officials. No accurate data available presently.    
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the employer and the CMHF to accept ABVAKABO as a negotiating partner. Consultations 
with both parties brought the minister of Justice to amend the Judicial Public Employee Act in 
this respect (Moll, 2001a), resulting in the termination of the CMHF’s monopoly on collective 
bargaining in this sector.   
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5 CONCLUSION 
This report has discussed the development of public sector industrial relations since the 
introduction of the sector model in 1993. About the institutional framework in brief: the 
reform of the public sector in 1993 resulted anno 2001 in the establishment of twelve sectors, 
which were founded either on the criteria of devolution or function. In the first case, more 
actors perform as employer, in the second case a single actor is responsible. The employees 
are represented by four public sector employee trade union confederations ACOP, AC, 
CCOOP and CMHF. In order to coordinate their interests on central level, both employers and 
confederations joined hands (in VSO for public sector employers and SCO for public sector 
trade unions). Both founded the ROP-council as a bi-partite platform for negotiations. On 
sector level, affiliated unions of the confederations negotiate with the employers on the terms 
and condition of employment.  
Key characteristic in this context is the detailed procedure for collective bargaining, which 
obliges the public sector employer to come to terms with the trade union confederations about 
labour issues. This provision has to be understood in the light of the power to decide 
unilaterally. Just because the government, in its role as employer, has the ability to arrange for 
the terms and conditions single-handedly, some reinforcement of the position of the trade 
union confederations as negotiating partner seems indispensable. Even more so, because the 
collective right to strike for public sector employees suffers considerably more constraints 
than the similar right for private sector employees. 
Some authors (van Peijpe, Stekelenburg) value the ‘requirement of agreement’ as a 
compensatory provision’ in order to balance the powers in collective bargaining more evenly. 
Though it does not stand up to the power of the employer to make unilateral decisions, the 
condition of agreement leads to a result backed by a majority of the partners, which in most 
cases implies a majority of the confederations present at the negotiating table. 
As previously mentioned, the legally enforced position of the partners in collective bargaining 
was established in the sector State, prior to the implementation of the sectormodel. The 
confederations, which were partners in collective bargaining then, were acknowledged as 
representative. The legal provision served as a blueprint in deciding which participants should 
be admitted to collective bargaining on the sector level. No clear criteria for admittance in 
numbers or even distribution of union-membership have been issued so far. Next, the 
provisions do not specify ‘lack of representativeness’ or ‘public interest’ as legal grounds for 
suspension or withdrawal. 
The AC-case is the only example of an admitted confederation, which had to give up its 
position as a representative organisation. But this exclusion was not legally enforced. As 
mentioned previously: the AC-confederation gave up its position ‘voluntarily’, under 
mounting pressure of the other partners. Conversely, no other confederations have been 
‘knocking at the door’ since 1993. 
This leads to the first preliminary conclusion that the legal framework for representativeness 
has not been developing over the past years. It does not provide for clear indicators to 
establish legitimacy and the admittance of new participants, which makes it therefore 
incomplete. The implementation of the sectormodel left the positions of the participants 
unchanged. The legal framework (with its lacunas) has not been put to the test, as the single 
case of exclusion bears no legal marks, and admittance of new partners has not occurred.   
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The actual situation, however, shows that the position of social partners is somewhat different 
from what was the startingpoint in 1993. That is, in some sectors. All trade union 
confederations kept their seats at the negotiating tables in the sectors State, Education, 
Defence and Police. The position of the negotiating partners in these sectors seems 
undisputed.In the sectors Provinces, Local Authorities and District Waterboards, however, the 
AC-confederation lost its position due to a sudden shift in membership. The density was 
experienced by the other social partners as sub-critical and not to be left without 
consequences. Apparently the AC gave up its seats. The exclusion was not challenged, and 
the AC did not bring the matter to an administrative court.  
The exclusion of the AC-confederation raises questions about the motives for exclusion, 
bearing in mind the density rates of the CMHF-confederation in these sectors, which are even 
lower (Annex 2, Table 8). At first, this fact seems rather arbitrary. But on second instance, it 
reflects the relative value of density as an indicator for the position at stake. A more even 
distribution of membership might add up to the relative position as well. Finally, the picture 
that emerges out of interviews, is that in the respective sectors the CMHF as negotiation 
partner is accepted to a greater extent than the AC. This matter is subject of further research. 
Until recently the CMHF claimed the position of exclusive negotiating partner in the sector 
Judiciary. In the past years the ACOP-confederation, having considerable membership under 
administrative employees working in the judiciary and (probably) outnumbering the CMHF-
share easily, has been requesting persistently to be admitted. Consultations with both parties 
brought the Minister of Justice to amend the Judicial Public Employee Act in this respect 
(Moll, 2001a), resulting in the termination of the CMHF’s monopoly on collective bargaining 
in this sector. The relative stronger position of the ACOP will most likely result in a place at 
the negotiating table. As figures show (Annex 2, Table 7), the ACOP has considerable 
membership in all sectors and, on balance, the largest share in public sector union 
membership. The ACOP has been accepted in all other sectors as a partner in collective 
bargaining. 
The second preliminary conclusion is that de facto representativeness is not entirely based on 
density rates. In addition, the evenness of distribution and the degree of acceptance play an 
important role as well. Clearly the representativeness de facto of negotiating partners in the 
public sector corresponds only partially with an incomplete framework for representatives de 
jure. In four sectors (Provinces, Local Authorities, District Waterboards and Judiciary), the 
representativeness of social partner organisations is not clearly established and being to a 
certain extent even arbitrary, as the density rates alone are apparently not a clear reflection of 
their respective position in collective bargaining. This consequently reflects on the 
‘requirement of agreement’. To what extent does the ‘compensatory function’ stand, if ‘the 
confederations which on account of the number of public sector employees they represent, 
can be judged as representative’, are unable to refer to clear indicators to back their position? 
Out of this perspective of representativeness emerges a somewhat ‘blurred’ image. 
An explanation for the state of representativeness in the Dutch public sector may be twofold. 
In the development towards ‘new’ industrial relations, priority was given to the 
implementation of 'the sectormodel. Partners, which had been in consultation in the old 
structure, accepted each other. An indication for this explanation rises out of an evaluation of 
the sectormodel three years ago (ROP, 1999). Social partners agreed then that this issue was 
one of the subjects to attend to more carefully in the near future.  
The second explanation is of a more global kind. None of the partners expressed so far an 
urge to settle the issue in public sector context. This attitude probably not only reflects the 
typical relation of the social partners in the Netherlands, but also the Dutch ambivalent   
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attitude towards legislation in general. The Dutch solution was the following: the legislator set 
a global legal framework, providing for a legal minimum, leaving social partners room to 
develop the issue at stake. As long as both employers and confederations agree implicitly on 
the matter, the legislator will abstain from action. Only in case a problem occurs, partners will 
see to the matter and engage in a dialogue. If judged necessary, the legislator will take part in 
these consultations.   
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ANNEX 1 PLAYERS 
Table 1  Central level 
Central Level  Employer(s)  Forum  Employees 
  League of Public Sector 
Employers (VSO) 
Council for Public Sector 
Labour Relations (ROP) 
Cooperating Public Employee Trade 
Union Confederations (SCO) 
Source:   Raad voor het Overheidsperoneelsbeleid, 1999. 
 
Table 2  Sector level (territorial) 
Sectoral Level  Employer(s)  Forum  Employees 




•  General Confederation of Public Sector Personnel 
(ACOP),  
•  Christian Confederation of Educational and Public 
Sector Personnel (CCOOP),  
•  Centre of Public Sector Employees (AC),  
•  Confederation of Managerial and Professional 
Personnel employed in the Public Sector, Education, 











•  General Union of Public Employees/Catholic Union of 
Public Sector Employees/Dutch Independent Union 
for the Public- and Non-profit Sector 
(ABVAKABO/FNV/NOVON), 
•  Christian Confederation of Educational and Public 
Sector Personnel (CCOOP),  
•  Confederation of Managerial and Professional 
Personnel employed in the Public Sector, Education, 
Companies and Institutions (CMHF) 
Local 
Authorities 




for the terms and 
conditions in Local 
Authorities (LOGA)
•  General Union of Public Employees/Catholic Union of 
Public Sector Employees/Dutch Independent Union 
for the Public- and Non-profit Sector 
(ABVAKABO/FNV/NOVON), 
•  Christian Confederation of Educational and Public 
Sector Personnel (CCOOP),  
•  Confederation of Managerial and Professional 
Personnel employed in the Public Sector, Education, 
Companies and Institutions (CMHF) 
District 
Waterboards 





for the terms and 
conditions of 




•  General Union of Public Employees/Catholic Union of 
Public Sector Employees/Dutch Independent Union 
for the Public- and Non-profit Sector 
(ABVAKABO/FNV/NOVON), 
•  Christian Confederation of Educational and Public 
Sector Personnel (CCOOP), 
•  Confederation of Managerial and Professional 
Personnel employed in the Public Sector, Education, 
Companies and Institutions (CMHF) 
Source:   Raad voor het Overheidsperoneelsbeleid, 1999.   
  24
Table 3  Sectoral level (functional) 
Sectoral Level  Employer(s)  Forum  Employees 




•  General Confederation of Public Sector Personnel (ACOP), 
•  Christian Confederation of Educational and Public Sector 
Personnel (CCOOP), 
•  Centre of Public Sector Employees (AC), 
•  Confederation of Managerial and Professional Personnel 








  •  General Confederation of Public Sector Personnel (ACOP), 
•  Christian Confederation of Educational and Public Sector 
Personnel (CCOOP), 
•  Centre of Public Sector Employees (AC), 
•  Confederation of Managerial and Professional Personnel 










  •  General Confederation of Public Sector Personnel (ACOP), 
•  Christian Confederation of Educational and Public Sector 
Personnel (CCOOP), 
•  Centre of Public Sector Employees (AC), 
•  Confederation of Managerial and Professional Personnel 









  •  General Confederation of Public Sector Personnel (ACOP), 
•  Christian Confederation of Educational and Public Sector 
Personnel (CCOOP), 
•  Centre of Public Sector Employees (AC), 
•  Confederation of Managerial and  
     •  Professional Personnel employed in the Public Sector, 










•  General Confederation of Public Sector Personnel (ACOP), 
•  Christian Confederation of Educational and Public Sector 
Personnel (CCOOP), 
•  Centre of Public Sector Employees (AC), 
•  Confederation of Managerial and Professional Personnel 
employed in the Public Sector, Education, Companies and 
Institutions (CMHF) 




•  General Confederation of Public Sector Personnel (ACOP), 
•  Christian Confederation of Educational and Public Sector 
Personnel (CCOOP), 
•  Centre of Public Sector Employees (AC), 
•  Confederation of Managerial and Professional Personnel 
employed in the Public Sector, Education, Companies and 
Institutions (CMHF) 
Police  Minister for the 
Interior 
Joint Consultative 
Body Police (GOP) 
•  Dutch Police Union (NPB), 
•  General Christian Police Union (ACP) 
•  General Christian Polie Association (ANPV) , 
•  Association of Managerial and Professional Police 
Employees (VMHP)  




•  Confederation of Managerial and Professional Personnel 
employed in the Public Sector 
Source:   Raad voor het Overheidsperoneelsbeleid, 1999.   
  25
ANNEX 2 REPRESENTATIVITY 




Local Authorities  175.192 







Source:   Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 1997 
Table 5  Union density of public employees, January 2000 (% of sectoral employment)  
Sector/Confederation CCOOP  ACOP  AC  CMHF  Total 
State  7,8 19,6 11,2  4,7 43,3 
Provinces  6,6  37,9 2,8 0,6  47,9 
Local  Authorities  6,7  34,4 1,1 0,8  43,1 
District  Waterboards  10,6  29,4 0,1 0,4  40,5 
Education  14,3  23,9 1,8 4,7  44,6 
Defence 15,8  28,2  30,1  2,8  76.8 
Police    31,2  38,4 4,0 1,7  75,4 
Judiciary 0  0  0  89,2  89,2 
Total  Public  Sector  12,6  27,1 5,7 3,6  48,9 
Source:   Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2000b 
Table 6  Union density of public sector employees 1994-2000 (% of sector employment) 
Sector/year  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
State  46.4  47,8 47,9 44,6 41,8 39,7 43,3 
Provinces  51,5 49,1 48,7 49,0 46,7 46,7 47,9 
Local  Authorities  46,2 45,4 46,7 44,8 44,1 43,8 43,1 
District  Waterboards  37,2 37,7 38,0 38,1 38,9 39,9 40,5 
Education  45,6 46,7 47,5 46,3 42,9 44,5 44,6 
Defence  68,0 82,3 85,9 98,8 88,7 77,4 76,8 
Police    79,0 74,0 72,9 72,6 73,7 73,5 75,4 
Judiciary  81,1 87,1 88,7  unknown unknown  unknown 89,2 
Total  Public  Sector  50,3 51,5 52,6 52,6 49,2 48,6 48,9 
Source:   Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2000 
                                                 
6   Data on the sectors University Education, Higher Vocational Education, Research Institutes and Academic Hospitals not 
available and not taken into consideration.   
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Table 7  Share in public sector employee union membership, January 2000 (% of sector 
union membership) 
Sector/Confederation CCOOP  ACOP  AC  CMHF  Total 
State  18,0 45,2 25,8 10,8  100 
Provinces 13,7  79,1  5,8  1,2  100 
Local Authorities  15,5  79,8  2,5  1,8  100 
District Waterboards  26,1  72,5  0,2  0,9  100 
Education  32,0 53,5  4,0 10,5  100 
Defence 20,5  36,7  39,1  3,6  100 
Police   41,3  50,9  5,3  2,2  100 
Judiciary  0  0  0 100 100 
Total Public Sector  25,7  55,4  11,6  7,3  100 
Source:   Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2000, conversion Moll 
Table 8  Number of union members employed, January 2000 (public sector trade union 
confederation) 
Sector/Confederation CCOOP  ACOP  AC  CMHF  Total 
State  9.013 22.676  12.927  5.433 50.049 
Provinces  830 4.743  356  71 6.000 
Local Authorities  12.378  63.239  2004  1.502  79.123 
District Waterboards  944  2.612  6  34  3596 
Education  53.039 88.692 6.534  17.296 165.561 
Defence  11.995 21.378 22.834 2.104  58.311 
Police   14.513  17.897  1.876  793  35.079 
Judiciary 0  0  0  2.130  2.130 
Total  Public  Sector  102.712  221.237  46.538 29.363 399.850 
Source:   Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2000b 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
English Dutch  Abbreviation 
Advisory and Arbitration Committee  Advies- en Arbitrage Commissie  AAC 
General Union of Public Employees/Catholic 
Union of Public Sector Employees 
Algemen Bond van Ambtenaren/Katholieke 
Bond van Overheidspersoneel 
ABVA/KABO 
National Assistance Act  Algemene Bijstandswet  ABW 
Centre of Public Sector Employees   Ambtenarencentrum  AC 
General Confederation of Public Sector 
Personnel 
Algemene Centrale voor Overheidspersoneel  ACOP 
General Christian Police Union  Algemeen Christelijke Politiebond  ACP 
Genral Dutch Police Association  Algemene Nederlandse Politie Vereniging  ANPV 
General Relatives Act  Algemene Nabestaandenwet  ANW 
General Old Age Pensions Act  Algemene Ouderdomswet  AOW 
General Public Employee Regulation  Algemeen Rijksambtenaren Reglement  ARAR 
Public Servants Act  Ambtenarenwet  AW 
Academic Hospitals  Academische Ziekenhuizen  AZ 
Occupational Education and Adult Education  Beroepsonderwijs- en Volwasseneneducatie  BVE 
Employers Administrative Consultative Body  Bestuurlijk Werkgevers Overleg  BWO 
Centre for Public Sector Labour Relations  Centrum Arbeidsverhoudingen  CAOP 
Collective arrangement for the terms and 
conditions of employment 
Collectieve Arbeidsvoorwaarden Regeling  CAR 
Christian Confederation of Educational and 
Public Sector Personnel 
Christelijke Centrale voor Overheids- en 
Onderwijzend Personeel 
CCOOP 
Committee for Consultation in Police and 
Public Employee Issues 
Commissie voor Georganiseerd Overleg in 
Politie- en Ambtenarenzaken 
CGOP 
Confederation of Managerial and 
Professional Personnel employed in the 
Public Sector, Education, Companies and 
Institutions 
Centrale van Middelbare en Hogere 
Functionarissen bij Overheid, Onderwijs, 
Bedrijven en Instellingen 
CMHF 
Christian Trade Union Federation  Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond  CNV 
Christian Trade Union Federation 
Public Affairs 




Board of Labour Affairs  College van Arbeidszaken  CVA 
Dutch Trade Union Federation  Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging  FNV 
Semi-Public Sector   Gepremieerde en Gesubsidieerde Sector  G&G-sector 
Local Consultative Body  Georganiseerd Overleg  GO 
Higher Vocational Education  Hoger Beroepsonderwijs  HBO 
Supreme Court  Hoge Raad  HR 
Interprovincial Consultative Body  Interprovinciaal Orgaan  IPO 
Interprovincial Employers League  Interprovinciaal Werkgeversverband  IWV 
Local Advisory and Arbitration Committee  Lokale Advies- en Arbitrage Commissie  LAAC 
National Consultative Body for the terms and 





National Consultative Body Academic 
Hospitals 
Landelijk Overleg Academische 
Ziekenhuizen 
LOAZ 
National Consultative Body for terms and 
conditions of employment in Local 
Authorities 
Landelijk Overleg Gemeentelijke 
Arbeidsvoorwaarden 
LOGA 
Federation of Managerial and Professional 
Staff Unions 
Vakcentrale voor Middelbaar en Hoger 
Personeel 
MHP 
Dutch Independent Union for the Public- and 
Non-profit Sector 
Nederlandse Onafhankelijke Vakbond voor 
de Overheids- en Non-profitsector 
NOVON 
Dutch Police Union  Nederlandse Politiebond  NPB 
Research Institutes  Onderzoeksinstellingen  OI   
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Primary Education  Primair Onderwijs  PO 
Regional Committee for Consultation in 
Police and Public Employee Issues 
Commissie voor Georganiseerd Overleg in 
Politie- en Ambtenarenzaken 
RCGOP 
Council for Public Sector Relations  Raad voor het Overheidspersoneelsbeleid  ROP 
Cooperating Public Employee trade Union 
Confederations 
Samenwerkende Centrales van 
Overheidspersoneel 
SCO 
Sector Committee Education  Sectorcommissie Onderwijs en 
Wetenschappen 
SCOW 
Sectoral Consultative Body Defence  Sectoroverleg Defensie  SOD 
Sector Committee State  Sectoroverleg Rijkspersoneel  SOR 
Sector Committee Judiciary  Sectorcommissie Rechterlijke Macht  SORM 
Sectoral Consultative Body for the terms and 




Labour Foundation  Stichting van de Arbeid  STAR 
Union of District Waterboards  Unie van Waterschappen,  UvW 
Execution Agreement   Uitvoeringsovereenkomst  UWO 
Associations of Academic Hospitals  Vereniging Academische Ziekenhuizen  VAZ 
Association of Managerial and Professional 
Police Employees 
Vereniging van Middelbare en Hogere 
Politieambtenaren 
VMHP 
Union of Local Authorities  Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten  VNG 
Secondary Education  Voortgezet Onderwijs  VO 
Association of Dutch Universities  Verenigde Samenwerkende Nederlandse 
Universiteiten 
VSNU 
League of Public Sector Employers  Verbond Sectorwerkgevers Overheid  VSO 
Disablement Benefits Act  Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheids-
verzekering, 
WAO 
Consultative Body Higher Education and 
Scientific Research 
Werkgevers Beraad Hoger Onderwijs en 
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek 
WBHW 
University Education  Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs  WO 
Works Council Act  Wet op de Ondernemingsraden  WOR 
Employers Association of Research Institutes  Werkgeversvereniging 
Onderzoeksinstellingen 
WVOI 
Unemployment Benefits Act  Werkloosheidswet  WW 
Sickness Benefits Act  Ziektewet  ZW 
 